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cial legislation to solve the problem. This may be a harsh condensa-
tion, but the main thought of the material advances the idea that the
courts, in states where there is no legislative reform, may bring about
their own revision of the rule against perpetuities by taking notice
of the great body of legislative reform. Some authority is cited to
show that the courts may and should do this. Will they do so? Even
the authors admit that we will have to "wait and see."
One may have doubts as to the value of a book of this type. This
is not to suggest that the material is inferior. The work is an excel-
lent treatment of one of the more difficult phases of the law. How-
ever, the fact must be faced that it has not added anything new to
the law relating to perpetuities. As the title page informs you: This
is a reprint.
JOHN E. HowEt
CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF
1858. Edited by Paul M. Angle. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958. Pp. 422. $7.50.
During the Faubus affair last autumn, editor-columnist David
Lawrence came to the defence of "white supremacy" by quoting Abra-
ham Lincoln. Well, that may not be quite fair: technically, Mr.
Lawrence was using Lincoln as authority for the proposition that the
Supreme Court is not the final interpreter of the Constitution. After
all, had not the Court, in 1857, declared that slavery could not be pro-
hibited in any territory of the United States," and had not Lincoln
four years later ignored this decision by asking: "Can Congress pro-
hibit slavery in the territories?" and treating that question as un-
settled?2
If Mr. Lawrence had perused the Lincoln-Douglas joint debates
and individual campaign speeches of 1858, now put together in a
handsome centennial edition edited by Paul Angle, he could have
found more Lincolnian ammunition for his attack on judicial su-
premacy. Also, surprisingly, he could have discovered some language
seeming to support "white supremacy." What about this, for in-
stance: "I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the
white and black races, that I am not nor ever have been in favor of
making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold
office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition
to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black
t Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857).
2. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.
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races which I believe will for ever forbid the two races living to-
gether on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they
cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the posi-
tion of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in
favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race."3
That was Lincoln speaking-Abraham Lincoln at Charleston, Illi-
nois, on September 18, 1858.
Yet surely, say the faithful, this picture of the Great Emancipator
as anti-court and anti-negro must be fantastically false. Surely, by
the same method of quoting out of context or presenting only part of
the picture, we can portray Lincoln as a precedent-respecting lawyer
and as an apostle of racial equality and freedom. This picture would
be at least as true as the other. To find a better likeness than either
we must look at the record. The transcript of the 1858 debates pro-
vides as complete a record as any of Lincoln's views, for--despite his
opponent's charge that he was tailoring his opinions to suit his audi-
ences--he was both candid and consistent. In-"Created Equal?" we
can find what he believed about the Dred Scott decision, slavery, and
equality.
The seven Lincoln-Douglas debates were hard-hitting verbal bat-
tles fought in an extremely close and bitter Senatorial campaign. The
campaign attracted national attention originally because Douglas
was the presidential hope of the northern Democrats. It soon put
Lincoln into the limelight because on hustings he was at least as
effective as the eloquent Little Giant. Commenting on Dr. Angle's
book, Adlai Stevenson is quoted on the book's "dust jacket" to the
effect that the debates set "undimmed before every candidate for
public office a model of the democratic dialogue befitting that respect
they owe to the intelligence of a free and educated people." Cer-
tainly the sixth debate, at Quincy, deserves this accolade, as do sub-
stantial parts of the other debates. However, a good deal of the give-
and-take came perilously close to mud-slinging. Douglas spent much
time trying to smear Lincoln and the Republicans as participants in
an abolitionist plot. Lincoln answered by accusing Douglas of using
"forged" evidence. Going back to the days when, as a Representative,
Lincoln had criticized the Mexican War, Douglas came near to charg-
ing his opponent with treason; meanwhile Lincoln was making vehe-
ment but vague charges that the Senator had "conspired" with Presi-
dents Pierce and Buchanan and Chief Justice Taney to foist slavery
onto the entire country and that the Dred Scott opinion was a fruit of
this conspiracy. This line of attack lacked substance and petered out;
yet Lincoln, in suggesting that there was something irregular about
3. P. 235.
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the Supreme Court's behavior in the Dred Scott case, was closer to
the truth than he knew.4 And if Dred Scott led him into one false start,
still he knew that that decision must be the foundation of his whole
campaign. For Taney's opinion raised directly the three great issues:
(1) the role of the Supreme Court and the respect due its decisions;
(2) whether slavery would be permitted in the territories; and (3)
the status of the American negro.
First, the role of the Supreme Court. Today we are aware of how,
in the Dred Scott case, the Chief Justice went far beyond necessity in
using three different grounds as the bases of the decision. It would be
pleasing to think that Lincoln, the lawyer, attacked the opinion ac-
cordingly, and dismissed two-thirds of Taney's language as mere
dicta. Indeed in aiming his fire chiefly at that part of the opinion
which held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, Lincoln was
attacking it at its weakest point. The Court had declared that it
lacked jurisdiction to decide the case, the question being one of Mis-
souri law.5 It had added, unnecessarily, that it lacked jurisdiction also
because Dred Scott, being a negro, was not a citizen and so could not
sue in federal courts. Then, having disclaimed jurisdiction, it went
on to pass on the validity of an already repealed Act of Congress.
Unfortunately, in 1858 Brandeis's Ashwwnder opinion, with its
"canons" of judicial self-restraint, was still far in the future. It
would have served Lincoln well. Even without it, however, Lincoln
clearly implied that in saying that slavery could not be prohibited in
the territories the Court was straying beyond proper judicial bounds.
He spoke of this part of the opinion as formulating a "political rule."
Because the "holding" which protected slavery in the territories was
not a judicial holding at all, but was obiter dicta laying down a "po-
litical rule," he did not feel bound to respect it. "If I were in Con-
gress," he declared, "and a vote should come up on a question whether
slavery should be prohibited in a new territory in spite of the Dred
Scott decision, I would vote that it should." Lincoln denied having
any disrespect for courts. "What are the uses of decisions of courts?
They have two uses. As rules of property they have tvo uses. First-
they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this
4. The publication of President Buchanan's papers, long after his death, and
subsequent research have revealed that political motivations underlay both Chief
Justice Taney's opinion and the dissent, and that the Court's decision was se-
cretly disclosed to Buchanan in time for him to insert a paragraph in his inau-
gural address, on March 4, 1857, praising the Court and urging acquiescence in
its rulings. The Dred Scott decision was handed down two days later.
5. It was on this relatively simple basis that the majority at first agreed to
rest the decision, following the precedent of Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10
Howard) 82 (1851).
6. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that,
but they say to everybody else, that persons standing just as Dred
Scott stands is as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes
up upon another person it will be so decided again, unless the court
decides in another way, unless the court overrules its decision ... "7
Second, the significance of that part of the Dred Scott opinion
which declared that the fifth amendment prohibited the outlawing of
slavery in the territories. Lincoln attacked this not only as a "political
rule" but as one which "lays the foundation not merely of enlarging
and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the founda-
tion for spreading that evil into the states themselves."8 The "evil,"
of course, was slavery. Just how the Court might have proceeded to
strike down state laws outlawing slavery it is hard to see, for in 1858
there was no fourteenth amendment with its due process clause to
protect the slaveholder against state action. Did Lincoln expect the
Taney court to overrule Barron v. Baltimore? 9 Or was he conjuring
up an imaginary bugaboo to frighten the voters? However that may
be, he was firm and forthright and eloquent when he spoke of the
"evil" itself. And it appears that he was indeed convinced that some-
how the slave system could be imposed on the northern states, for in
his first and most famous campaign speech he said: "Either the op-
ponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it
where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of
ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall
become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new-North as
well as South."' 0 Lincoln was no abolitionist. He wanted only so to
"deal with it [slavery] that in the run of time there may be some
promise of an end to it."" But he left no doubt of his hatred of
slavery: "We think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong."' 2
This is not the place to deal at length with the other use which
Lincoln made of the Dred Scott opinion's application to the terri-
tories: the "Freeport question" of how Douglas could support Dred
7. Speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858, p. 36. Even though Lincoln did not ex-
pressly equate "political rule" with "obiter dicta," it is reasonable to assume that
this was his implication. A similar analysis of the opinion, attacking the Court
for purporting to rule on "political subjects" (slavery in the territories) in a case
which it was dismissing for want of jurisdiction, had been published in 1857 by
former Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri. See Chambers, Old Bullion
Benton 433 (1956).
8. Opening speech at Quincy, October 13, 1858, p. 333.
9. 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243 (1833).
10. Speech at Springfield, June 16, 1858, p. 2.
11. Opening speech at Quincy, October 13, 1858, p. 332. This moderation made
Lincoln "available" for the Republican presidential nomination of 1860.
12. Ibid.
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Scott and "squatter sovereignty" at the same time.13 To save his seat
in the Senate, Douglas could not afford to alienate those northern
Illinois Democrats and old Whigs who believed'in territorial self-
determination on the slavery issue. So he straddled, enunciating the
"Freeport heresy" that any territorial legislature could in effect
nullify Dred Scott by refusing to enact legislation to protect slave-
owners.14 To this Lincoln replied that every legislator was sworn to
uphold the Constitution, and if (which he did not admit) the Consti-
tution required that slavery be permitted in the territories, a legis-
lator would be violating his oath if he went along with Douglas's
doctrine of nullification-by-inaction.1
The third issue raised by Taney's Dred Scott opinion related to the
status of the American negro. Taney's view-again unnecessary to
the decision of the case-was that under the Constitution, no negro
could be a citizen. Douglas agreed with this; in fact, when speaking
"'down in Egypt" (near Cairo in southern Illinois) Douglas used
language vigorous enough to please the "white supremacists" of
today.16 Lincoln answered on a high moral plane, constantly harking
back to the Declaration of Independence. As we have seen, he was in
no hurry to accord full political and social equality to negroes. But
in a fervent passage at Ottawa early in the campaign (and he re-
peated this word-for-word at Quincy) Lincoln declared his position,
hitting both the moral foundation of slavery and the notion that the
Constitution consigned negroes permanently to a sub-human status:
"There is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all
the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence,
the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he
is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with Judge
Douglas he is not my equal in many respects-certainly not in color,
perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment. But in the right to
eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand
13. Opening speech at Freeport, August 27, 1858, pp. 143-44.
14. This straddle saved Douglas in Illinois, but it bitterly angered the South-
ern slavocracy and its Northern spokesman, President Buchanan. The journalis-
tic voice of this faction, the Washington Union, coined the phrase "Freeport
heresy." Promptly the Democratic administration encouraged independent can-
didacies in the Illinois race. In the last two debates, Douglas spent much time
denouncing not Lincoln but these "renegades" and their journalistic organ. Again
he succeeded in Illinois-the split did not cost him the election-but his chances
of winning an undivided Democratic presidential nomination went glimmering.
A novelist has suggested that Lincoln's challenge at Freeport was calculated to
have precisely this effect; and it is true that while Douglas's straddle was not
new, it was publicized nationally for the first time after that debate. See Church-
ill, The Crisis (1929).
15. E.g., rejoinder at Quincy, p. 356.
16. Douglas's opening speech at Jonesboro, September 15, 1858, p. 200.
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earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal
of every living man."17
It is to this issue of negro status, presumably, that Governor
Stevenson refers when he says that the publication of "Created
Equal?" will do much to clarify an issue that has lost none of its
urgency in a hundred years." On this issue Douglas, not Lincoln, is
the "white supremacists'" man. For taking Lincoln whole, we can
easily believe that to him the inequalities which seemed permissible
in 1858 would be indefensible when the negroes were a century fur-
ther removed from the jungle and had all been free men for ninety-
five years. We cannot easily believe the contrary.
The question of slavery in the territories has no counterpart today,
but the question of judicial supremacy has. And here Lincoln's po-
sition is, on the whole, less comparable than Douglas's to the segre-
gationists' present viewpoint. True enough, Lincoln criticized the
decision. True, too, he looked forward to it being "peaceably" over-
ruled by the Supreme Court.18 He even implied that some courtpack-
ing might be desirable, in order to achieve this result." But in several
respects his stand was sharply different from the present position of
those segregationists who are bitter about Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.90
Lincoln believed, with good reason, that the Supreme Court in 1858
was the judicial arm of a political faction. The southern planters had
captured the Democratic party in the forties, and the executive and
legislative branches in the fifties. Lincoln viewed the Dred Scott de-
cision as evidence that the Supreme Court was also now committed to
furthering this faction's economic and political interests, and was
doing so by needlessly laying down a "political" rule ensuring the ex-
pansion of slavery. Today, whatever malcontents may say about the
Court, they cannot complain that it is sectional or politically partisan
or factional. Nor can they criticize the Brown decision as going be-
yond the necessity of deciding the case. In Brown the Court had to
construe the equal protection clause; it could not have decided the
case otherwise. Its holding was, inevitably, a "judicial" rule.21
17. Reply at Ottawa, August 21, 1858, p. 117.
18. Speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858, p. 36.
19. Reply at Ottawa, August 21, 1858, p. 129.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Respectable critics of Brown v. Board of Education do not assert that that
decision is a "political rule," nor can they claim that it is merely dicta. There
has been objection to the Court's use of sociological materials, implying that this
is a departure from the judicial function; but it is hard to sustain the view that
courts must shut their eyes to relevant data, sociological or otherwise.
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These are two major differences. The clincher, however, is that Lin-
coln believed in abiding by the Dred Scott decision (as distinguished
from the "political" dicta. in the opinion) until it might be over-
ruled, and said further that those who thought that the Court's "po-
litical rule" was actually a judicial holding were duty bound to imple-
ment it by legislative action. This is a far cry from interposition and
,nullification. It is the opposite of Douglas's "Freeport heresy." And it
is very different, too, from the position of most southern school boards
today, a position permitted and even tacitly made respectable by the
Supreme Court. For what have we in the South right now, but the
"Freeport heresy" in modern guise? The responsible governing
bodies disregard the Broun decision. They refuse to take the steps
needed to implement it. Thus they deprive it of effect, and flout the
Constitution-just as Douglas suggested that anti-slavery territorial
legislatures could render nugatory the Dred Scott decision a hundred
years ago. Lincoln denounced the "Freeport heresy": "There can be
nothing in the words [in an oath of office] 'support the constitution,'
if you may run counter to it by refusing support to any right es-
tablished under the constitution.' 2 Today countless schools boards
are "refusing support" to an established right-the right to unsegre-
gated education. If they read "Created Equal?" (the question mark
seems designed to make the title acceptable) they might then decide,
-with all deliberate speed, which spirit they really would wish to in-
voke today-Lincoln or Douglas? The answer, it seems to me, can
only be Douglas.
THOMAS H. ELIOTt
CITADEL, MARKET AND ALTAR, By Spencer Heath. Baltimore: The
Science of Society Foundation, 1957. Pp. xix, 259. $6.00.
This is an unusual book. An engineer has tried to develop a frame-
work for analyzing society. The reviewer does not find the result very
fruitful. This, of course, may be due to the shortcomings of the book
or the inability of the reviewer to fully grasp its significance.
The author's attempt to create an "authentic science of society,
founded on the same measurements and analyses, with the same
methods of observation and formulation as the natural sciences"' and
to use an analysis that "describes the societal structure as it operates
and exists, in terms of its mass, motion and duration content, and
22. Reply at Jonesboro, September 15, 1858, p. 219.
t Charles Nagel Professor of Political Science and Constitutional Law, Wash-
ington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
1. Pp. 7-8.
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